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ADMINISTRATIVE LAw--PowER OF BomA OF HEALTH TO LOCATE PESTHOUSES-
CANNOT CREATE NuISANcE.-The owner of private property sought to enjoin
the board of health from locating a pesthouse in a residential district, although
the board under a city charter had discretion in its location. Held, that the
injunction should be granted. Birchard et al. v. Board of Health of City of
.Lansing et al. (1918, Mich.) I69 N. W. gor.
This case illustrates the principle that apparently unlimited powers granted
to administrative boards cannot be exercised to create private nuisances, unless
the statute under which they act expressly so requires or unless the power is
otherwise impossible of exercise. Metropolitan Asylum Dist. v. Hill (188i,
H. L. Eng.) 6 A. C. 193, 212; Mayor of Baltimore v. Fairfield Improvement
Co. (1898) 87 Md. 352, 39 Atl. io8i. Where the power can be exercised with-
out creating a nuisance the discretion is limited to that extent. Barth v. Chris-
tian Psychopathic Hospital Asso. (1917) 196 Mich. 642, 163 N. W. 62. Had the
pesthouse been in existence, a newcomer to the neighborhood could probably
not have complained. See Upjohn v. Board of Health of Richland Township
(88) 46 Mich. 542, 9 N. W. 845. But how long it must have been in con-
tinuous operation before private persons are estopped from enjoining it as a
nuisance does not appear to be settled. It will necessarily depend considerably
upon the facts.
ALIEN ENEMY-DIsABITY TO SUE-PLEADING IN DEFExNSE.-In an action by
a person alleged to be an alien enemy the plaintiff's disability was not pleaded
by the defendant, but was brought out in cross-examination only. Held, that
the defense not having been pleaded as a part of the record, was inadmissible.
Heiler v. Goodman's Motor Express Van & Storage Co. (1918, N. J. Ct. Err.)
105 At. 233.
While this ruling was dictum only, the point has but rarely come up in recent
years. See Com rENTs, p. 68o, supra.
ALIEN ENEMY-PARTNERSHIP--AcION IN NAME OF FIRM WITH ONE ENEMY
PARTNER NOT INHIBITED.-A partnership consisting of five British partners and
one German, the latter domiciled in Germany, brought an action to recover a
pre-war debt due the firm. The partnership having been dissolved by the war,
the action was incidental to the effort of the British partners to get in the assets
for purposes of liquidation. The defendant pleaded in abatement the alien
character of one of the co-plaintiffs: Held (Lords Atkinson and Sumner
dissenting) that the action should not be stayed. Rodritues v. Speyer Brothers
(1918, H. L.) i19 L, T. Rep. 409.
See COMmENTS, p. 68o, supra.
CONTRACTS - ILLEGALITY - CONFESSED JUDGMENT - EQUITABLE RELIEF. - The
plaintiff, in consideration of the defendant's promise to procure a divorce,
agreed to pay her a monthly sum, and to confess judgment for $35,ooo. as
collateral security. The defendant secured the divorce, collected several pay-
ments, and then remarried. Further payments being refused, the defendant
entered judgment on the confession and levied execution. The plaintiff sued,
asking an injunction against proceedings on the execution, and further relief.
Held (two judges dissenting) that the execution should be vacated and the
defendant enjoined from enforcing the judgment. Schley v. Andrews (i919,
N. Y.) 121 N. E. 812.
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Contracts made in consideration of divorce fall among those held void as
against public policy. Pereira v. Pereira (igog) 156 Cal. I, io3 Pac. 488; cf.
also (1915) 24 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 348. Where the parties are in pari delicto
neither law nor equity will aid either, when the agreement has been wholly
executed. Platt v. Elias (i9o6) I86 N. Y. 374, 79 N. E. I. No-, it seems, may
property be recovered which has been transferred in part execution of the
agreement. Booker v. Wingo (1888) 29 S. C. 116, 7 S. E. 49. And so far as
the latter is wholly executory, the courts refuse all aid in its enforcement. See
(gIg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 502; (1917) 27 ibid. 273. Difficulty arises only
where the execution or enforcement is still partial. Where judgment has been
entered for one party to the illegal contract-at least where it was by confes-
sion, so that the other has not truly had his day in court-the judgment may
be opened to permit defence. Fields v. Brown (Igoo) 188 Ill. 111, 58 N. E. 977;
Bredin's Appeal (1879) 92 Pa. 241, 37 Am. Rep. 677. And there is authority
for staying execution proceedings, as in the principal case. Given's Appeal
(1888) 121 Pa. 26o, 15 Atl. 468. To refuse such a stay would indirectly give
judicial aid of a kind from which either wrong-doer may well be barred. And
allowing an apparent obligor to take the initiative in equity by enjoining suit
on a note, may be explained as in effect merely one form of defence. See
Booker v. Wingo, supra. Quaere: Whether negotiation of such a note would
be enjoined, or the note impounded and cancelled; such action would seem to
overstep the general rule outlined above. But at least one court has gone far
in aid of a wrong-doing obligor. A mortgage had been given, with power of
sale; sale under the power was enjoined, as likely to create a cloud on title,
and the mortgage was cancelled. Basket v. Moss (1894) 115 N. C. 448, 20 S. E.
733. As to recovery by the "dupe" against the "knave," though the trans-
action was illegal, see (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, ogo; also (I915) 24
ibid. 255.
CRIMINAL LAw-CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITy FOR Act OF SERVANT.-The New
York Labor Law (Consol. L. i9o9, ch. 31, sec. 162) prohibited the employment of
child labor. The penal statutes (Consol. L. Igog, ch. 4o, sec. 1275) provided
that violation of the Labor Law should be a crime punishable by fine for the
first offense, which for second offense might be followed by imprisonment.
The defendant, a corporation engaged in selling milk, was prosecuted for viola-
tion of the Labor Law by one of its servants, a wagon driver, who employed
a boy to watch his bottles. The defendant had prohibited such hiring by its
servants but had not adequately supervised the enforcement of its rules. Held,
that the defendant was guilty, since the Labor Law imposed a non-delegable
duty to suffer no violation of its provisions which could be prevented by
reasonable regulation; and since, further, a duty to make reparation to the
state for the wrongs of servants, when not carried beyond the payment of
a moderate fine, is a reasonable regulation of the right to do business by proxy.
People v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co. (1918, N. Y.) 121 N. E. 474.
It is the general rule that the master is not criminally liable for the acts of
his servants unless committed by his command or with his assent. 26 Cyc. 1546.
Quite frequently, however, statutes impose non-delegable duties upon the
master or principal when public health, morals, etc., are involved, and super-
vision is difficult. State v. Fagan (9o9) 24 Del. (I Boyce) 45, 74 Atl. 693.
The violation of such duties by a servant without the knowledge or even
against the direct orders of the master may subject the master to criminal
liability. State v. Gilmore (9o8) 8o Vt. 514, 68 Atl. 658, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
786; 13 Ann. Cas. 324, note (sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor) ; Tenement
House, etc. v. McDevitt (1915) 215 N. Y. 16o, 1O9 N. E. 88, Ann. Cas. 1917A
455 (use of house by lessee, for prostitution); Brown v. Foot (189n, Q. B.)
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66 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 649, 17 Cox C. C. 509 (milk adulteration by servant);
State v. Mason (1894) 26 Ore. 273, 36 Pac. 130, 26 L. R. A. 779 (libel published
without knowledge of newspaper owner). In such cases no criminal intent
is necessary. That the master is a corporation does not, therefore, relieve it.
7 Labatt, Master and Servant, 7932; Laski, Vicarious Liability (ii6) 26 YALE
LAW JouRNAt, 105, 130. Such absolute liability must depend upon the wording
and purpose of the statute. 7 Labatt, op. cit. 7892. These statutes are not
open to constitutional attack,-at least unless the fine is grossly dispropor-
tionate. Ibid. 7927; New York Cent. & H. R. R. v. United States (19o9) 212
U. S. 481, 29 Sup. Ct. 304; see Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (i9o8) 212
U. S. 86, ini, 29 Sup. Ct. 270. But the limit of criminal liability in all such
cases has been a money fine, or confiscation of the property involved. United
State v. Brig Malek Adhei (1844, U. S.) 2 How. 21o, 233; cf. for a common
procedure Chase v. Proprietors, etc. (igig, Mass.) 122 N. E. 162. It has been
intimated, however, that imprisonment of the master might be sanctioned, at
least where the law provides for imprisonment, on default of payment of a
fine. See Pearks, Gunston etc. v. Southern Counties Co. Ltd. [1902] 2.K. B.
I, ii. And the question may well come up in a stronger form in case of prose-
cution for a second offense under the statute involved in the instant case.
Although the majority refused to pass on this point, Crane, J., in a special
concurrence indicated his strong opinion that such imprisonment could not be
imposed. Even should the court decide to the contrary, it is difficult, in the
absence of express direction, to see how such a penalty could be enforced
against a corporation.
EsToPPEL BY MISREPRESENTATION-EFFECr OF REcORDING AcTs-FAILURE TO
REcoRD EQUITABLE CLAn.-The defendant permitted the record title to certain
land to stand in the name of another. This other was to the defendant's
knowledge engaged in a business which required the incurring of debts. The
persons who were so extending credit relied upon the record and also upon the
statement of the holder of the record title that he owned the property in ques-
tion. The holder of the record title when faced with bankruptcy proceedings
conveyed the property to the defendant. The trustee in bankruptcy brought the
present action to recover it for the benefit of the &editors. Held, that he was
entitled to the relief asked. Bergin v. Blackwooei (1919, Minn.) 17o N. W. 507.
See COmmENTS, p. 685, supra.
HuSBAND AND WIFE-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE IN CONTEMPLATION OF MAR-
RP.AGE-RFCovERY OF DOWER RIGHT.-A widowed father conveyed all his prop-
erty to his son without consideration. At the time, he was considering re-mar-
riage, and although he had no particular woman in mind, his motive in making
the conveyance was to deprive any future wife of her marital rights in his
property. Twenty-tvo months later he married the plaintiff, and lived with
her for more than a year until his death. The plaintiff widow brought a bill
in equity, setting out these facts and praying that the deed to the son be set
aside, and that she recover her dower and homestead rights. Held, that a
demurrer to the bill had been improperly sustained. Jarvis v. Jarvis (igig, Il1.)
122 N. E. 121.
Equity has always enforced a wife's marital rights in property which her
husband conveyed upon the "eve of marriage" with the intent to defraud her.
Roberts v. Roberts (1917) 131 Ark. 9o, 198 S. W. 697; Deke v. Huenkemeier
(1913) 26o Ill. 131, 102 N. E. lO59. Fraudulent intent must appear. A genuine
desire to make reasonable provision for children by a former wife validates the
conveyance. Goff v. Goif's Exrs. (1917) 175 Ky. 75, 193 S. W. 1OO9; Kinne v.
Webb (1893, C. C. A. 8th) 54 Fed. 34. Also the conveyance must have been
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made upon the "eve of marriage" or "in contemplation of marriage." The
interpretation of these phrases has undergone a marked change. Formerly,
the wife could not recover unless the conveyance had been made during the
engagement period or, at least, during the courtship. Butler v. Butler (i879)
21 Kan. 521; Gainor v. Gainor (1868) 26 Ia. 337, overruled in Beechley v.
Beechley (1907) 134 Ia. 75, io8 N. W. 762; cf. Allen v. Allen (912) 213 Mass.
29, 99 N. E. 462. The principal case represents the modem interpretation that
the conveyance is invalid even if made before acquaintance with the wife,
provided the husband's intention, at the time, was to defeat the marital rights
of any person he might later marry. Higgins v. Higgins (i9o5) 219 Ill. 146,
76 N. E. 86; Beechley v. Beechley, supra. This extension has led to a change
of view as to origin. Under the earlier rule, the right seemed to spring from
the peculiarly confidential relationship between persons already affianced, a rela-
tionship in which the law imposed a duty to refrain from any act exhibiting
bad faith. Ward v. Ward (19oo) 63 Oh. St. 125, 57 N. E. 1o95. This reason
loses its true ring when the parties may, at the time of the conveyance, be utter
strangers. Of late, therefore, the courts have been reasoning on the analogy of
a voluntary conveyance, with the intent to defraud future creditors, by one who
contemplates contracting debts. Deke v. Huenkemeier, supra; McAulay v.
McAulay (913) 96 S. C. 86, 79 S. E. 785. It would seem that the principal
case can best be supported on this ground.
LiBEL AND SLANDFR-LABmliTY OF CoPomAT .- The manager of the defend-
ant corporation accused his predecessor, the plaintiff, of theft of property
belonging to the corporation, and directed a search of his goods. The plaintiff
joined the corporation and its manager as co-defendants in an action for
slander. Held, that both defendants were liable, the corporation because its
agent had acted within the scope of his employment. Cotton v. Fisheries
Products Co. (1918, N. C.) 97 S. E. 712.
Distinction is no longer made between the liability of a corporation and of
a natural person for the torts of agent and servants. Goodspeed v. East
Haddarn Bank (1853) 22 Conn. 530; Denver & R. G. Ry. v. Harris (1887) 122
U. S. 597, 7 Sup. Ct. 1286. That corporations of earlier days were in general
exempted from such liability may be explained by their being then mostly of a
public or charitable nature; a ground no longer applicable. See 7 R. C. L.
682. Some recent writers, admitting that private corporations can be held for
most torts, would make an exception of slander, on the ground that one cannot
slander by deputy. Townshend, Slander and Libel ( 4 th ed., i8go) 474; Jag-
gard, Torts, 170; contra, Newell, Slander and Libel (3d ed., 1914) 436. This
hardly seems tenable. The rule that a slanderer is not liable for repetitions by
his hearer is wholly a limitation imposed by policy on a liability which would
normally otherwise exist. But suppose the slanderer expressly authorized a
repetition to a third party; or suppose he drilled an innocent person who was
ignorant of the language, and got such person to publish the words: would he
not be answerable for the slander in the repetition? There is more foundation
for the limitation imposed by some courts, that the corporation is not to be
held for mere loquacity in its agents, and is not liable unless it has authorized
or ratified the particular act of uttering the slander. Behre v. National Cash
Register Co. (1897) zoo Ga. 213, 27 S. E. 986; Mclntire v. Cudahy Packing Co.
(913) I79 Ala. 404, 6o So. 848. But so long as the law is settled the other
way, for individuals and corporations, in other torts generally and even in
libel, there seems to be little reason to make a lonesome exception of spoken
defamation. Hypes v. Southern Ry. (199o) 82 S. C. 315, 64 S. E. 695, 21
L. R. A. (N. S.) 873. The more consistent view is that of the instant decision,
for which there is ample authority. Payton v. People's Credit Clothing Co.
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(9o9) 136 Mo. App. 577, I'8 S. W. 531; Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Bridewell
(1912) 103 Ark. 343, 147 S. W. 64. On the master's criminal liability for the
acts of his servant, see supra, sub tit. CmmixAl LAw; on damages for slander
see (I918) 27 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 7oI.
POLICE Powna-CoNTAGIOUS DISEASES -COMPULSORY PHYSICAL EXAMINA-
TION.-Acting under general statutory powers to safeguard the public health,
a local board of health adopted a rule that persons suspected of having venereal
disease should be detained for physical examination, including the "Wasserman
test," which involved taking a blood-sample; if the examination disclosed
infection, the infected person was to be restrained at a house of detention until
the city's physician authorized release. The plaintiff, arrested on a charge of
lewdness, was held for examination under the above ruling, on order of the
board. He instituted proceedings in habeas corpus. Held, that the restraint
amounted to deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Wragg v.
Griffin (igig, Iowa) 17o N. W. 4oo.
The principal case presents the question as to how far liberty and privacy
of the person may be encroached upon under the police power in the interests
of public health. Under proper statutes, general vaccination may be ordered by
a board of health, when deemed advisable. Herbert v. School Board (i9x6)
I97 Ala. 617, 73 So. 321. For failure to submit, a penalty or a quarantine may
be imposed. See x2 R. C. L. 1287, i29o. Such quarantine seems ample to
prevent contagion; and forcible vaccination has never been upheld in this
country. See I7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 7o9, note; 25 L. R. A. i52, note. In this
connection see also Rhea v. Board of Education (I919, N. D.) 171 N. W. 1o3,
noted next month, RECENT CASE NOTmS, sub tit. STATUTORY CoNsTRucvxoN.
There is no question that persons known to have venereal, or any other con-
tagious or infectious disease, may be subjected to quarantine, under criminal
penalty. See 12 R. C. L. 292; 26 L. R. A. 489, note; Cal. Pen. Code 1909, sec.
394. And a person suffering from disease may have his liberty infringed in
other ways. Peterson v. Widule (914) 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966, Ann. Cas.
i9i6B io4o (male, to procure marriage license, must file physician's certificate
of freedom from venereal disease); (Ind.) Burns' Ann. St. 1914, secs. 225o,
2251 (epileptic forbidden sexual intercourse). But doubt arises regarding
forcible detention, on mere suspicion, for purposes of examination. Compulsory
denuding of the person has been held unconstitutional where its purpose was
to secure evidence which might lead to restraint of liberty, or to punishment.
State v. Height (i9o2) 117 Ia. 650, 91 N. W. 935; 5 Jones, Evidence, 344; but
see O'Brien v. State (i89o) 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137. But it may be questioned
whether detention under quarantine is sufficiently in the nature of a penalty to
bring this case within the law on self-incrimination. And the court intimates
that had the legislature expressly permitted such action as that of the board,
it might have been valid. The independent acts of a board of health, however,
are limited to such as are essential to protect the public. State v. Speyer (i895)
67 Vt. 502, 32 Atl. 476; Wong Wai v. Williamson (igoo, N. D. Cal.) io3 Fed. I;
see also Freund, Police Power, 133, 138. Physical examination on suspicion
may come to be considered essential; but the principal case seems decidedly
more in keeping with our traditions in not allowing this power to a board of
health until the legislature has spoken clearly. It is worth note that this
practice, though applied to prostitutes these many years, was only questioned
when the shoe began to pinch a man.
REcEIVERs-ALLowANcE OF CLms.--One English, having contracted with the
United States to erect buildings on a military reservation in Arizona, gave bond,
with the 2Etna Indemnity Company of Connecticut as surety, as required by
Act of Congress of August i3, 1894, ch. 28o, amended by Act of February 24,
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i9o5, ch. 778, 33 Stat. L 8ii (U. S. Comp. St. i916, see. 6923). English having
completed his contract but failing to pay certain persons supplying labor and
materials used in the construction of these buildings, suit was brought on the
bond in their favor as provided in the Statute, in the United States District
Court in Arizona. Thereafter the Superior Court for Hartford County, Connect-
icut, appointed a receiver over the Indemnity Company. The receiver pro-
ceeded to liquidate the affairs of the Company and, under authority of the
court of the receivership, defended the Arizona suit in the name of the
Company and later agreed to a judgment against the Company. Subsequently
the judgment holders made application to the court of the receivership to inter-
vene and present. their claims, which application -was denied, no appeal being
taken. Thereafter they again made application to the same court, reciting
the facts more fully and asking that the receiver be ordered to report their
claims. The receiver objected, contending that the claims were not presented
within the time limited for presenting claims to the receiver, that the receiver as
distinguished from the Company was not bound by the Arizona judgment, that
the court of the receivership need not recognize in any case, and could not thus
summarily be forced to recognize, a foreign judgment secured subsequent to the
date of the receiver's appointment, that no matured claim against the Company
existed at this date and that the denial of the previous application had made the
question res adjudicata. Held, that the receiver should report the claims as
allowed, since the actions of the receiver in connection with the Arizona suit,
done under authority of the court of the receivership, were sufficient to dis-
pense with formal presentation of the claims to the receiver, and had resulted
in an hdjudication of the amount of the claim made in the proper court specified
by the Act of Congress and assented to by the court of the receivership; and
since the claim was matured though unliquidated at the date of institution of
the receivership and the question was not made res adjudicata by the denial of
the previous application. Burford-Burmister Co. v. Ztna Indemnity Co. (1919,
Conn.) iO5 Atl. 47o.
The .tna Indemnity Company was surety on the bond of one Caldwell,
trustee for the benefit of creditors of a building trust company in Kentucky.
Caldwell having converted funds of the trust, suit was instituted on the bond
in a Kentucky court in 19o3 against him and the Indemnity Company. Judg-
ment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and all parties appealed. Thereafter
the Superior Court for Hartford County, Connecticut, appointed a receiver
over the Indemnity Company, and the receiver, under authority of the court of
the receivership, defended the action on appeal in the name of the Company.
A new trial was ordered which resulted in a larger judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. Plaintiff then applied to the court of the receivership, asking that
the receiver be ordered to report his claim for the full amount thereof as an
allowed claim. The receiver contended that the claim was contingent when
the receiver was appointed, that no claim was presented to the receiver within
the time limited for presenting claims, and that the claim was based upon a
foreign judgment rendered subsequent to the receiver's appointment. Held,
that the application should be granted; the claim being matured though unliqui-
dated at the date of the receiver's appointment, and the receiver's authorized
defense of the Kentucky action making unnecessary any other presentation of
the claim, and making the resulting judgment binding as to the validity and
amount of the claim. Husbands v. iXtna Indemnity Co. (1919, Conn.) 1O5
Atl. 48o.
See COMMENTS, p. 673, supra.
REcEMNG STOLEN GOODS-OBTAINING PROPERTY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES-
STATUTORY LARcENY.-F fraudulently ifiduced a broker to loan money on
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forged stock certificates. The broker turned his check over to his bank, which
in turn created a deposit credit for F in a New York bank. The accused,
knowing of the fraud, received money drawn by F from this account, and was
indicted under the New York statute for receiving stolen goods. Held, that
the accused was not guilty, as the identity of the property taken from the owner
had been entirely destroyed. People v. Hanley (1919, App. Div.) 173 N. Y.
Supp. 692.
New York, by statute, has made the obtaining of property under false pre-
tenses, larceny. N. Y. Penal Law, sec. i2go. It seems that only such property
as is a subject of larceny can be obtained by false pretenses. State v. Klinken-
berg (1913) 76 Wash. 466, 136 Pac. 692. But the New York statute has
extended such "property" to cover "any . . . thing in action, evidence of debt
or contract or article of value of any kind." Sec. i2go, supra. This language
has been held to cover such instruments as are not merely evidential, like a
common receipt, but are operative in character. People v. Griffin (1869, N. Y.)
38 How. Pr. 475; cf. State v. Scanlon (19o3) 89 Minn. 244, 94 N. W. 686. So
a check; and in the instant case the broker was induced to draw and part
with a check to his bank. This would seem to make out the crime under the
Alabama law. Clark v. State (1916) 14 Ala. App. 636, 72 So. 291 (person
fraudulently induced to give a suretyship bond to a third party, which he had
to pay). But the New York statute has been construed to apply only to instru-
inents complete before they were "obtained" by the accused; and not to cover
fraudulently procuring such an instrument to be made and delivered, even to
oneself. People v. Deinhardt (1913, N. Y.) 179 App. Div. 228, 166 N. Y. Supp.
5o2 (deed). Hence, in the principal case F obtained both the bank credit and
its proceeds without larceny, and held the "legal title" thereof. Like any
defrauder, he might have been charged by the person defrauded as constructive
trustee of whatever he had received in exchange for the property obtained by
fraud. Farwell v. Kloman (1895) 45 Neb. 424, 63 N. W. 798; see American
Sugar Co. v. Fancher (1895) 145 N. Y. 552, 4o N. E. 2o6. And statutes have
made trustees-in New York "trustees of any description"--guilty of larceny
for intentional conversion. N. Y. Penal Law, secs. 1290, 1302; R. I. Genl. L.
igo9, ch. 345, sec. i6. But whether constructive trustees would be held to fall
-under the language of these sections may well be doubted. If not, the principal
case is clearly sound; as such an interpretation would be necessary to convict
of receiving stolen goods, even if the accused had received the identical "trust"
res-the claim against the bank-instead of its proceeds.
SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE-MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION.-L had contracted to
exchange his land in Illinois for R's land in Canada. L then made a contract
with K for the sale of the Canada land to be received from R: K to buy on
certain terms, but to have the power of annulling the contract by defaulting
and forfeiting $5oo liquidated damages. As security to K, L "assigned" his
contract with R to a stakeholder. This suit was brought by K and the stake-
holder to compel specific performance (I) of R's contract with L; (2) of L's
contract with K Held, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief, since as
to them the contracts were not "mutual in obligations and remedy, and enforce-
able by either party." Lunt et al. v. Lorscheider et al. (I918, IIl.) 121 N. E. 237.
Equity should grant the plaintiff specific performance of a bilateral contract
-unless, after the defendant's forced performance, the plaintiff's own obligation
will remain unperformed and is of such a nature that the defendant will still,
on grounds independent of mutuality, be refused specific performance. See
COMMENT (1917) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 261. This doctrine covers the almost
universal rule that a plaintiff, though his own promise is oral, may have specific
p~erformance if the defendant has signed the memorandum. West em Timber
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Co. v. Kalama River Lumber Co. (igo6) 4- Wash. 62o, 85 Pac. 338. So even
in the state of the instant case. Ullsperger v. Meyer (195o) 217 Ill. 262, 75
N. E. 482. And married women, and infants upon reaching majority, may have
specific performance, although equity would not so have aided the other party.
Fennelly v. Anderson (i85i) i Ir; Ch. 76, and Mullens v. Big Creek Gap Coal
Co. (I895, Tenn. Ch. App.) 35 S. W. 439 (married women); Clayton v. Ash-
down (714) 9 Vin. Abr. 393 (infant). And where the plaintiff, although not
specifically compellable, has already in fact fulfilled his obligation, equity will
grant him specific relief. Topeka Water Supply Co. v. Root (i895) 56 Kan.
187, 42 Pac. 715 (personal services exchanged for land). Similarly one whose
own faulty title precludes him from specific performance may yet be compelled
to convey. See Jasper v. Wilson (19o8) 14 N. Mex. 482, 492, 94 Pac. 951. And
so with one who has agreed to loan on an insurance policy, although he could
not have forced the other party to borrow. See (i918) 27 YALE LAW JouRNAL,
1083. The decisive factor is the condition of the defendant after the decree;
in the last case suit on the debt at law is in effect specific enforcement of repay-
ment. Nor should it be of consequence that the plaintiff had by the contract
a power and privilege-i. e., "option"-to terminate his obligation; and this
view the Supreme Court has recently adopted. Guffej, V. Smith (1914) 237
U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526. If the defendant secures or has assurances 
of
securing every thing for which he contracted, he has in fairness no ground for
objection. Hence equity, in England and many of our states, enforces his
obligation. Lumley v. Wagner (1852, Eng. Ch.) i De G. M. & G. 6o; Zelleken
v. Lynch (igo9) 8o Kan. 764, 104 Pac. 563. So in the principal case, although
neither R nor L had specific remedy against the plaintiffs, each seems amply
protected. To obtain relief against R under the assignment or against L on
his contract, the plaintiffs must tender performance of every condition prece-
dent bargained for. In refusing relief the court mechanically follows the old
formula of mutuality as given in Fry, Specific Performance ( 4 th ed., 1903) 203,
obscure though it is in principle, and artificial in extent. While it is still
impossible to determine the arithmetical weight of authority, it is believed that
the tendency toward casting aside this formula is fast gaining way. See Com-
mENT, supra; Pucini v. Bumgarner (1918, Okla.) 175 Pac. 537.
SuRETYsHIP-SuBROGATON OF CREDITOR TO INDEMiNITY BOND GIVEN TO SURETY
BY A STRANGE-The plaintiff, having sued as creditor of W, attached certain
chattels. To dissolve the attachment W filed a surety bond signed by the
Illinois Surety Company. This surety company first obtained a bond of
indemnity from the defendant. Later the surety company became insolvent, and
the plaintiff claimed to be subrogated to its rights against the defendant,
created by the indemnity bond. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to
subrogation. Dinsmore v. Sachs (1919, Md.) io5 Atl. 524.
There are many cases holding that a .creditor is subrogated to the rights of
his surety with respect to- securities given to the surety by the principal debtor.
Maure v. Harrison (1692) 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 93, p. 5; Ames, Cases on Surety-
ship, 620, and note. There are some limitations on this rule. See Jones v.
Quinnipiack Bank (i86o) 29 Conn. 25. There are two theories on which the
creditor's foregoing right of subrogation is based. (i) The surety is fre-
quently said to hold the security as a trust fund for payment of the creditor's
claim against the principal debtor. Moses v. Murgatroyd (1814, N. Y.) i
Johns. Ch. 119. This theory is not always approved, even where the securities
in question were deposited by the principal debtor himself. It is certainly not
applicable in a case like the present where the securities are deposited by a
stranger solely for the purpose of indemnifying the surety. Hampton v.
Phipps (1882) io8 U. S. 26o; Hasbrouck v. Carr (1914) i N. Mex. 586, x45
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Pac. 133. (2) The second theory is that the surety holds the securities in order
to be sure of exoneration (and not merely reimbursement), and the best way to
secure this is to let him assign the securities to the creditor, or to let the
creditor himself collect by direct action. This theory is not generally adopted,
but if it is sound it would apply in the present case. No fund was deposited
by the defendant with the surety company, as a trust fund, nor was the defend-
ant's promise made to the surety company as trustee. Nevertheless, if the
defendant's promise to the surety company was to save it harmless, to exonerate
and not merely to reimburse, then the performance of the promise involves a
payment directly to the creditor. The creditor might well be regarded as a
third-party beneficiary. Complete exoneration of the surety company requires
full settlement with the creditor, the fact that the surety company is insolvent
being immaterial in this respect. This would perhaps be otherwise if the
surety company has been totally dissolved. See Hasbrouck v. Carr, supra. On
this theory, the rights of both the surety company and the creditor will be fully
vindicated by action in the creditor's name against the defendant, without refer-
ence to the complexities of subrogation. To this action the surety company
should be made a party.
ToRTs-INjuaY CAUSED By FRIGHT-DAAGES.-The defendant's chimpanzee
escaped, entered the plaintiff's house and attacked her children. The plaintiff
drove the animal away but became hysterical and ill because of fear for her
own and children's safety. She sued the owner of the animal for the injuries
caused by the fright. Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Lindley v. Knowl-
ton (1918, Cal.) 176 Pac. 140.
No recovery can be had for pure fear not resulting in bodily effects. Chittick
v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co. (i909) 224 Pa. 13, 73 Atl. 4; Reed v. Ford (igo8)
33 Ky. L. Rep. io29, 112 S. W. 6oo, ig L. R. A. (N. S.) 255. Nor where the
fear is wholly for the safety of a third person. Sanderson v. Northern Pacific
Ry. (1902) 88 Minn. 162, 92 N. W. 542. By the weight of authority, fear for
one's self which is followed by bodily suffering is ground for the recovery of
damages. McGee v. Vanover (1912) 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W. 42; Samarra v.
Allegheny Valley St. ROy. (913) 238 Pa. 468, 86 Atl. 287; Denver R. Co. v.
Roller (igoo, C. C. A. 9th) ioo Fed. 738; contra, Mitchell v. Rochester (1896)
15i N. Y. io7, 45 N. E. 354. Also fear may be considered as an operative
element and affect the amount of damages when it results either from or in
physical suffering, or produces a visible injury to the nervous system. Watson
v. Augusta B. Co. (19o3) 124 Ga. 121, i L. R. A. (N. S.) 1178, 11o Am. St. 157;
Conley v. United Drug Co. (914) 218 Mass. 238, 1O5 N. E. 975. On remote-
ness of mental anguish as barring recovery, see (i916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
243; on mental suffering for desecration of the dead, see (i916) 28 ibid. 508,
and CuRRFNT DEcsioNs, infra, sub tit. ToRTS.
TORTs-LABOR UNIONS-BANNERING AND STRIKE-"RIGHT TO WoRK IN ONE'S
OwN BusNEss--The constitution of the defendant union excluded all theatre
owners. The plaintiff, a theatre owner, insisted upon operating his own moving
picture machines part of the time, to save expense. To force him to employ
union men to do this work the union men ceased to work for him and the
defendant union published in the official labor paper that the plaintiff was
"unfair,' and caused a banner bearing that message to be paraded in front
of the theatre. The plaintiff, whose business fell off in consequence, applied
for an injunction pendente lite. It was refused and the plaintiff appealed.
Held, that the desire to force the plaintiff to replace his own services in his
own business with those of the defendant's members was not such a motive as
justified the defendant's acts injuring the plaintiff's business; but that the
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trial court had acted within its discretion in refusing the injunction pendente
lite. Roraback v. Motion Picture Operators' Union of Minneapolis (1918) 144
Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766.
A union is privileged to use lawful means to procure the discharge of a non-
union worker when the sole- motive is to secure the work for themselves. The
discharged employee has no right of action against the union. National Pro-
tective Assn. v. Cummings (19o2) 17o N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369; Shinsky v.
O'Neil (igig, Mass.) 121 N. E. 79o, discussed in (1919) 28 YALE LAw Jou.RAL,
611. Nor has the employer any right that the union shall not take such action.
Steifes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union (1917) 136 Minn. 2oo, 161
N. W. 524; but see Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick (1917) 227 Mass. 382, I16
N. E. 8oi. But the principal case maintains that where the plaintiff plays the
double role of workman and employer and is working in his own business, the
union may not force him to desist. This doctrine may be sustained upon a
ground which the court does not consider, viz., that inasmuch as the defendant
will not allow him to become a member of their union, they should not be
permitted to ruin his business because of his non-membership. Lutke v. Cloth-
ing Cutters, etc. (1893) 77 Md. 396, 26 Atl. 505. The majority opinion argues
that the plaintiff's rights against the defendant arise from the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment. These certainly confer an immunity upon all citi-
zens, from certain interferences by state governmental agencies. But such
immunity does not carry with it, as a logical necessity, rights in one citizen
against other individuals. Civil Rights Cases (1883) l09 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18;
see Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 779, com-
menting on' Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell (1917) 245 U. S. 229, 38
Sup. C. 65, Ann. Cas. 19i8B 461. It may well be that public policy at times
requires the co-existence of such rights with the immunities in question, but
the fact should be borne in mind that the requirement is not one of logic, but
one of policy, to be determined in each case.
TRUSTS-MAssAcHTusETTs BirSINESS TRUSTS NoT "AssocIATIoNs" UNDER
INcOME TAx AcT.-Certain mills and other property in Massachusetts were
partly conveyed, partly leased, to a Massachusetts corporation. The reversion
of the property leased was conveyed to trustees, who executed a declaration
of trust: declaring that they held the reversion and all other property received
-under the trust for the benefit of the cestuis (who should be trust beneficiaries
only, without partnership, association or other relation whatever inter sese)
upon trust at the discretion of the trustees to convert the same into money and
distribute the net proceeds to the then holders of the trustees' certificates,
within twenty years after the death of specified persons. In the meantime the
trustees were to have the powers of owners; they were in their discretion to
distribute net income to the certificate holders or apply it to capital. The
powers of the certificate holders were limited to consenting: to any increased
remuneration of the trustees, to any filling of vacancies among the trustees,
and to any modification of the terms of the trust. The trustees' receipt pro-
vided that the holder was to have no interest in any specific property. The
stock of the lessee corporation was also left in the trustees' hands; but the
trustees' function was not to manage the mills, but only to collect the rents
and income. The income of this lessee corporation had been taxed in the hands
of the corporation, but an additional tax was levied on the income from the
shares held by the trustees, as on income of an "association" under the Income
Tax Act of October 3, 1913, ch. i6, sec. II, G (a), 38 Stat. L. 114, i66, 172,
taxing the income of "every corporation, joint-stock company or association,
and every insurance company, organized in the United States, no matter how
,created or organized, not including partnerships." The trustees brought suit
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to recover the amount of the tax so levied. Held, that they might recover, as
the trust was not a "joint-stock association" within the Act. Crocker v. Malley
(March 17, 1917) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, I918, No. 649.
See COMMENTS, p. 69o, supra.
WuILs-JOINT AND MUTUAL-CONTRACT NOT To REvoxm.-The plaintiff and his
wife executed a joint and mutual will devising all the property owned by them
jointly or severally to the survivor. Before and after the execution, the plain-
tiff purchased property, taking the title to part in his wife's name and to the
remainder in their names jointly. The wife later secretly made another will,
leaving her entire estate to the defendants, her son and daughter by a former
marriage. The later will having been admitted to probate, the plaintiff brought
this action in equity against the devisees to enforce the terms of the pricor will.
Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to such "relief. Hermann v. Ludwig et al.
(i919, App. Div.) 174 N. Y. Supp. 469.
Equity will enforce the terms of a joint and mutual will which was made
pursuant to a contract by both parties not to revoke the same, although the
deceased has done so by a later will. In re Hoffert's Estate (1917) 65 Pa.
Super. Ct. 515; Bower v. Daniel (19o6) 198 Mo. 289, 95 S. W. 347. The theory
is that the will itself is revoked, being an ambulatory instrument, but equity
enforces the contract by imposing a trust on the devisees of the later will
according to the provision of the earlier one. See COMMENT (1918) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 542. The question in the principal case is whether such a con-
tract has been established. Although a joint and mutual will might well be in
itself sufficient evidence of a contract not to revoke, the rule seems settled to
the contrary. Buchanan v. Anderson (19o5) 70 S. C. 454, 50 S. E. 12; Estate
of Crawley (i89o) 136 Pa. 628, 2o Atl. 567. But such a contract may be estab-
lished if there are in addition circumstances and indirect evidence other than
the will itself. See Edson v. Parsons (1898) 155 N. Y. 555, 567; 5o N. E. 268.
So in the principal case. And where the survivor has taken benefits under, the
mutual will and later revoked, the courts require less outside evidence to find
a contract; for it would be inequitable for the survivor to benefit and not
comply with his agreement. Rastetter v. Honinger (1915) 214 N. Y. 66, io8
N. E. 21o; Frazier v. Patterson (igog) 243 Ill. 8o, go N. E. 216. Also, there
is authority that either party is privileged to rescind the contract and revoke, if
he does so during the lives of both by sufficient notice. See Stone v. Haskins
[19O5] P. 194; Duvale v. Duvale (i896, Ch.) 54 N. J. Eq. 581, 588; 35 AtL.
75o. But no such notice was given in the instant case. Therefore, the court
seems justified in its decision, since the circumstances strongly indicated a
contract, and the equities of the case were strongly in favor of the plaintiff.
